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Abstract
In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the eects
of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egali-
tarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small rm's matching model
of unemployment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to implement
and systematically compare these solutions in search-matching economies. Our results are
twofold. First from the theoretical and methodological viewpoint, we extend a somewhat

exible search-matching economy to alternative bargaining solutions. In particular, we prove
that the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable within
search-matching economies. Second, our results show that even though the traditional re-
sults of bargaining theory apply in this context, they are generally qualitatively dierent
from the standard results, and the dierences are quantitatively weaker than expected. This
is of particular relevance in comparison with the results established in the earlier literature.
JEL Classication: C71; C78; J20; J60;
Keywords: Search and matching models, Bargaining theory, Nash, Egalitarian, Kalai-
Smorodinsky5
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Non-technical summary
Search-matching models of unemployment have become the standard tool for studying labor
markets. A major feature of these models is to consider in
ows and out
ows, rather than
stocks, as natural starting points for any question about the labor market. They have been
widely used to study a wide range of both theoretical and policy questions. Among them, a
large literature has been devoted to the determinants of structural unemployment in Europe,
to labor market reforms, and to the characteristics of cyclical unemployment dynamics. This
paper discusses an hypothesis about the bargaining structure of the search-matching model.
At the heart of the model is the concept of local monopoly rent, which insures the stability
of the worker{rm relationship. This rent emerges from the existence of transaction costs to
nd the appropriate partner for productive activities. The rent is crucial for the length of the
employment relationship: as long as it is positive, the match is suciently productive to be
economically relevant. Once set, the rent has to be shared between the rm and the worker by
a wage rule.
In the bulk of the search and matching literature, the conventional approach to determine
wages is based on the use of a specic bilateral bargaining scheme, initially proposed by Nobel-
prize winner John Nash. Although this Nash criterion is used almost exclusively in economic
applications, there is a priori no particular rationale { either empirical or theoretical { to restrict
the bargaining scheme to this criterion alone. To our knowledge, the Nash solution to the wage
bargaining problem is popular for two reasons. First, it oers a 
exible technical solution and
allows to calculate the bargained wage on the basis of marginal information only. Second, it can
be recovered from an extensive game where both the rm and the worker play a well-dened
sequence of moves and have preferences over both the time and the terms of agreement.
However, these arguments do not justify restricting the bargaining scheme for worker-rms
pairs; other solutions exist in the literature. Taking the Nash solution as a benchmark, we
consider the two other key alternative solutions that have emerged in bargaining theory, namely
the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. The rst one, the egalitarian bargaining
solution, imposes equal gains for both parties. Wages are chosen so as to give an equal return
from reaching an agreement. The second one, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, is characterized
by equal proportional concessions for both agents from their respective aspiration levels. These
most favored bargaining points can be conceptualized as utopia points.
Our central results are twofold. First from a theoretical and methodological viewpoint,
we extend a somewhat 
exible search-matching economy to alternative bargaining solutions.
Second, our results show that even though the traditional results derived from Nash bargaining6
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apply in this context, they dier remarkably in both qualitative and quantitative terms as
compared to the results established in the earlier literature. In particular, we show that if for
risk-neutral workers, the three bargaining schemes lead to the same labor outcomes, things turn
out to be dierent when workers are risk-averse. However, based on simulated labor markets,
we conclude that these dierences appear to be small. A main consequence is that the policy
implications are not very sensitive to the choice of the bargaining solution used within the
canonical search-matching model.7
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1 Introduction
Search-matching models of unemployment have become the standard for studying aggregate
labor markets. The existence of transaction costs on the labor market results in a local monopoly
rent which is shared through bilateral bargaining between the rm and the worker. In the bulk
of the search and matching literature, the conventional approach to determine wages is based
on the use of a generalized Nash criterion (see for instance the surveys by either Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1999 or Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005). Although this criterion is used
almost exclusively in economic applications, there is, a priori, no particular rationale { either
empirical or theoretical { to restrict to the Nash criterion alone. Consequently one may wonder
why the Nash solution is so popular. Usually, two lines of arguments are put to the fore.
First, the Nash solution is 
exible and allows to calculate the bargained wage on the basis of
marginal information only. Second, it has a natural strategic counterpart (see e.g. Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1990). These two lines of argument, however, are not entirely compelling.
As a matter of fact, the Nash solution has been challenged on theoretical grounds. On the
one hand, various objections have been raised against his axiomatic treatment. Among others,
the independence to irrelevant alternatives axiom (IIA) has been the object of considerable
controversy mainly because of the fact that it implies independence to contractions of the feasible
set1. On the other hand, the precise meaning of the Nash rule, a product of utility gains, is not
easily interpretable (Thomson, 2010).
As emphasized by Thomson (2010), others solutions2 such as the Kalai-Smorodinsky (Kalai
and Smorodinsky, 1975) and the Egalitarian (Kalai, 1977) solutions3 are important challengers
to the Nash's solution in bargaining theory, and have, for the most part, been put aside.
Finally, the prevalence of the Nash solution is all the more questionable in that a number
of classical controlled lab-experiments cast some doubts on its relevance (see e.g. Nydegger
and Owen, 1974, Nydegger, 1977), and tend to support the Kalai-Smorodinsky (hereafter, KS)
solution over the Nash solution (Heckathorn, 1978). This latter result appears however to be
fragile as it is dicult to create an experimental design to disentangle the KS and the Nash
bargaining solutions (Binmore, Swierzbinski, Hsu, and Proulx, 1993). More recently, Bruce and
Clark (2010) show that subjects in a two-party, two-attribute experiment prefer Egalitarian
outcomes to the Nash bargain.
Despite this, discussions have remained mostly conned to the social choice/bargaining lit-
1Axioms and bargaining solutions are presented in a detailed form in section 3.
2Those solutions are brie
y discussed below and then detailed in section 3.
3It is worth remarking that these two solutions: (i) have also strategic counterparts, see e.g. Moulin, 1984
or Miyagama, 2002; (ii) confute the (IIA) axiom and are characterized by the possibility of direct interpersonal
comparison of utility (for the Egalitarian solution) and weaker requirement on the feasible set (for the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution), see section 3 for a detailed exposition.8
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erature and, until recently, have been largely ignored in labor economics. Early and notable
exceptions are McDonald and Solow (1981) and Alexander (1992) who oer characterizations
of the Nash and the KS solutions in an ecient contract and a right-to-manage model, respec-
tively. Recent contributions in labor economics suggest however that the Nash solution may be
too simplistic. In this perspective, the papers from Laroque and Salani e (2004), Gerber and
Upmann (2006), and Dittrich (2010) are of particular interest.
Laroque and Salani e (2004) use the KS solution to characterize the spread of the minimum
wage to the wage distribution in an ecient contract model  a la McDonald and Solow (1981).
They show that under the Nash solution, a marginal increase in the minimum wage does not
aect the wage distribution due to a specic assumption regarding Nash's IIA axiom which
makes the bargained wages independent of the minimum wage. The authors convincingly argue
that such a property is counterfactual and that the KS solution is the one that is best suited
from this particular standpoint. In what follows, we depart from these authors and consider
only bargained wages, thereby excluding all others institutional wage agreements.
Gerber and Upmann (2006), again in an ecient contract model, challenge the innocuousness
of the Nash solution. They argue that the labor market equilibrium hinges essentially on the
bargaining solutions considered. In particular, they show that with the KS solution an increase
in the reservation wage has an ambiguous eect on unemployment and that under reasonable
parameter values employment may increase. This key result contradicts the traditional eect
found with the Nash solution. They further demonstrate that alternative solution concepts such
as the Egalitarian solution and the equal-loss solution (Chun, 1988) exhibit the same type of
ambiguity. They conclude that this puzzling employment eect is by no means a pathological
or degenerate case and is more likely to be the rule than the exception.
Dittrich (2010) considers a dual labor market with a minimum-wage sector and a unionized
sector. This structure allows endogenizing the outside option in the ecient contract model as a
weighted average of the minimum wage and unemployment benets. The key result is that with
the KS solution, an increase in the minimum wage has an ambiguous eect on employment.
There is hence a need to answer a more general question regarding the innocuousness of the
bargaining solutions and assumptions in labor economics. Although the usual specication in
the prevailing search-matching framework is Nash ex-post bargaining, the universality of this
assumption needs to be questioned. Indeed, as emphasized by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999),
wage determination is a major issue in the context of search equilibrium modeling. Existing liter-
ature (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) has focused on alternative wage setting mechanisms
(e.g. insider-outsider divide, monopoly union or eciency wage) but has neglected alternative
bargaining solutions. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst paper that attempts9
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to systematically characterize the way in which bargaining solutions aect equilibrium unem-
ployment in a search and matching model of the labor market.4 Taking the Nash solution as a
benchmark and following Thomson (1994, 2010), we consider the two other alternative solutions
that have emerged in bargaining theory, namely the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solutions. In a nutshell, the Egalitarian solution assigns equal gain to both parties whereas
the KS solution grants the same percentage gain of the maximally attainable outcome over the
disagreement point to each player.
At this point, it is important to emphasize that our approach has been kept simple on
purpose, in order to obtain, whenever possible, analytically tractable results and to focus on
comprehensible mechanisms. This voluntary parsimony is however not restrictive and enables us
nonetheless to characterize a number of positive and normative properties of the three solutions.
Our central results are twofold. First from a theoretical and methodological viewpoint, we
extend a somewhat 
exible search-matching economy to alternative bargaining solutions. In par-
ticular and contrary to common beliefs, the Egalitarian and the KS solutions are proved to be
easily implementable and mathematically tractable within search-matching economies. Second,
our results show that even though the traditional results derived from Nash bargaining apply in
this context, they dier remarkably in both qualitative and quantitative terms as compared to
the results established in the earlier literature (see for instance, Gerber and Upmann, 2006 and
Dittrich, 2010). More precisely, through the paper we contrast two economies: an economy with
perfectly transferable utility which serves as our benchmark and an economy with a partially
transferable utility only.5 In the former case, we show that the three bargaining solutions boil
down to a unique solution and yield a Pareto optimal resource allocation when the economy
is constrained ecient. In the latter case, when utility is not perfectly transferable because of
workers' risk aversion, the three solutions are proved to diverge and a rst-best resource allo-
cation is not feasible when wages are bargained over. Interestingly, the nonlinear discrepancy
between the Nash and the KS solutions is proved to be small and this from both a qualitative
and a quantitative viewpoint. This is not only the case in the neighborhood of linearity as might
be expected, but also generalizes at high (and reasonable) levels of risk aversion for plausible
parameter values. Of secondary interest, but nevertheless worth mentioning, is that under Con-
stant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) the Nash and KS solutions yield similar outcomes when
the Arrow-Pratt coecient of risk aversion is equal to 0 and 2, i.e. for boundary values in the
4Similar questions have been separately raised in search models of monetary exchange (see Aruoba, Rocheteau
and Waller, 2007).
5Following Burdett and Wright (1998), transferable utility refers to the case where the frontier in utility is
linear while non-transferable utility refers to the case where outside institutions or constraints yield non-linearity
in the frontier. In this article, the frontier is nonlinear because of workers' preferences and because we do not
introduce any additional constraints for discontinuity. To avoid any confusion between the linear and nonlinear
case, we say that utility is partially transferable when workers are risk-averse.10
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range accepted in the literature.6 In general, the Nash and KS solutions behave similarly under
fairly mild conditions. Therefore, and except for considerations specic to the axiomatic dier-
ences between bargaining solutions, the KS solution oers no signicant improvement over the
Nash solution for labor market analysis. Results are more contrasted as regards the Egalitarian
solution. The dierence between the Nash and the Egalitarian solutions is much stronger. This
contrast owes much to the axiomatic dierence between the two solutions, in particular the
scale invariance property. Finally, the three solutions are proved to behave identically following
a change in the key structural parameters. This is analytically true for the solutions considered
in the neighborhood of linearity and globally for the Nash and the Egalitarian solutions. How-
ever, because of the proximity between the Nash and the KS solutions, the results generalize
for the KS solution to a wide range of plausible parameter values. Hence our results again run
counter to those previously established in the literature.
The outline of this article is as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized search model. Section
3 details the bargaining solutions under consideration. A particular emphasis is put on some
key axioms. Section 4 focuses on the key properties of the model when utility is perfectly
transferable. Section 5 extends the model to the case of partially transferable utility. The
properties established in section 4 are then discussed and illustrated in the case of partially
transferable utility. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The benchmark model builds on a continuous-time search and matching framework. The core of
the model is in many ways similar to the canonical textbook model of Pissarides (2000, Chapter
1), the objective being to remain as close as possible to a well-established framework, except that
alternative bargaining solutions are considered. We will consider a slightly modied framework
in section 5 of this paper. For the remainder of the paper, we will restrict the analysis to the
steady state.
2.1 Main assumptions
We consider an economy populated with a continuum of innitely-lived and homogenous workers
and a continuum of identical rms holding at most one vacancy. The size of the population is
normalized to one. All agents discount future payos at the rate r > 0.
The labor market has matching frictions. Searching for a job and matching with a worker
are costly activities. Frictions are captured by a customary matching function, H, with constant
6See Chetty (2006) for a review.11
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1359
July 2011
returns to scale. The 
ow of hires satises H(;u) where  and u indicate the number of vacancies
and unemployed, respectively. Let   =u be the labor market tightness. The transition rate
for vacancies is q() with q()  H(;u)= = H(1;1=). Similarly, the 
ow out of unemployment
is q() with q()  H(;u)=u = H(;1). The properties of the matching function imply that
q() and q() are decreasing and increasing in labor market tightness, respectively. Filled jobs
are destroyed at a Poisson rate s. The evolution of the unemployment rate satises:

u = s(1   u)   q()u (1)
In a steady-state, the unemployment rate is obtained by equating the 
ows out of unemployment,
q()u, to the 





It is worth remarking here that the steady-state unemployment rate, u, is decreasing in the





Let U and E(:) denote the lifetime expected utility of an unemployed worker and an employed
worker, respectively. The associated value functions verify:
rU = v(z) + q()(E(w)   U); (3)
rE(w) = v(w) + s(U   E(w)): (4)
Workers' utility stems from an instantaneous von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function,
v(:) with the usual properties. According to eq. (3), an unemployed worker earns an instan-
taneous real return z and changes state on the labor market at rate q(). In turn, eq. (4)
indicates that a worker earns an income 
ow w and changes state at rate s.
Let V and J(:) denote the lifetime expected value of an open vacancy and an occupied job,
respectively. The associated value functions verify:
rV =  
 + q()(J(w)   V ); (5)
rJ(w) = y   w + s(V   J(w)): (6)
Recruiting is costly. According to equation (5), advertising a vacant job incurs a 
ow cost 
. A
vacancy changes state at a rate q(). Similarly, equation (6) states that a lled job yields an
instantaneous prot y   w and changes state at a rate s.12
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3 Bargaining
In this section, we describe the bargaining problem related to the settlement of a contract be-
tween a worker and a rm. We rst detail the set of feasible outcomes and then apply three
standard bargaining solutions to the problem { the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Egalitarian
solutions. It is important here to mention that two complementary approaches to bargaining
coexist in the literature. The rst one, initiated by Nash (1950), is axiomatic. Based on a set of
behavioral properties, or axioms, it denes the class of solutions consistent with these proper-
ties, and is thus mainly normative. The second approach is strategic. It describes the necessary
strategic conditions to reach an agreement in a non-cooperative game. In the present paper,
we aim to analyze the equilibrium properties of the three dierent solutions. For the sake of
parsimony, we restrict ourselves to the axiomatic approach and focus on the normative proper-
ties of the dierent solutions rather than on the specic non-cooperative bargaining conditions
required to reach an agreement. It is worth noting nevertheless that the dierent solutions also
have strategic foundations (see e.g. Moulin, 1984 or Miyagawa, 2002).
Upon matching, a job-worker pair generates a local monopoly rent. This rent originates
from the matching frictions on the labor market and implies that the expected total return from
productive activities, J + E, is strictly greater than the total return from search, U + V . This
rent is then shared through a constant wage rate resulting from a decentralized rm-worker
bargaining. Assuming symmetric equilibria, the aggregation of match-specic wage rules leads
to an aggregate wage equation.7
3.1 The feasible set
The bargaining problem can be described in a two-dimensional space of the expected lifetime
utilities of both agents. In order to characterize it, two elements are necessary: the disagreement
point and the set of feasible allocations obtained when an agreement is reached. The disagree-
ment point is equal to the values of continued search for the rm and the worker, namely
d = (V;U). It is worth observing from (4) that a wage set at w = rU makes the worker in-
dierent between employment and unemployment: E(rU) = U. Similarly, according to (6),
a wage set at w = y   rV makes the value of a job to the rm identical to the value of va-
cant job, hence J(y   rV ) = V . Consequently, the disagreement point can also be written as
d = (J(y   rV );E(rU)) and the wage w must satisfy the following constraint in an agreement
point: y   rV  w  rU. Let 
 dene the set of allocations obtained when an agreement is
7For an in-depth explanation, see Pissarides (2000, Chapter 1). For the remainder of the paper, and in order
to minimize the notations, we will consider only symmetric equilibria.13
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reached; 
 is the set of feasible allocations:

 = fx 2 <2j9w 2 <;rU  w  y   rV;x  X(w) and X(w)  dg (7)
where X(w) = (J(w);E(w)) for rU  w  y rV is the Pareto frontier, and where (a;b)  (c;d)
if and only if a  c and b  d. (
;d) is a standard two-agent bargaining problem where 
 is
convex and closed, and the individually rational utility allocations are bounded. The following
two lemmas prove that (
;d) satises these two properties:
Lemma 1. 
 is convex and closed.
Proof. The Pareto ecient allocations are given by (4) and (6). The Pareto-frontier is dened
as the set of all points (J;E(J)) with E(J) = [v(y   (r + s)J + sV ) + sU]=(r + s). Since
v0 > 0 and v00  0, the rst and second derivatives of E(J) are negative, the Pareto frontier is
strictly decreasing and strictly concave. Convexity of 
 follows. By continuity of E and J, 
 is
closed.
Lemma 2. The set of individually rational utility allocations f 2 
j  dg is bounded and
there exists  2 
 with j > dj for j = 1;2.
Proof. The maximum value from a job to the rm is reached when worker is paid her reservation
wage w = rU. The maximum value from a job to the worker is reached when w = y   rV so
that she captures the entire surplus from the match. If  2 
 is individually rational (  d)
then   (J(rU);E(y  rV )) and f 2 
j  dg is bounded. By (4) and (6), E(w) is increasing
in w and J(w) is decreasing in w. There exists e w = rU + ,  2 (0;y   rV   rU) such that
(J(e w);E(e w))  d. Therefore there exists  2 
 with j > dj for j = 1;2.
We now proceed with the exposure of the three key solutions. We restrict ourself to symmetric
bargaining and choose as a benchmark a case where utility is perfectly transferable.8 This case
constitutes the standard search and matching framework (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000, and Rogerson
et al., 2005). Technically, it amounts to assuming that the utility function is increasing and linear
in its argument; we will relax this hypothesis in section 5. Each solution yields an aggregate
wage equation. In equilibrium, combined with a job creation condition, the aggregate wage
equation determines the equilibrium values of labor market tightness, , and of the wage, w.
Finally, given these values, one obtains thanks to eq. (2) the steady state unemployment rate.
8The results readily extend to asymmetric bargaining; proofs are available upon request from the authors.14
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1359
July 2011
3.2 The Nash solution
The Nash solution (1950) is the most common solution to determine wages in the bulk of the
literature on labor markets with frictions. It follows from the maximization of the expected
present value of the job to the worker and to the employer, net of the value of searching for
an alternative partner. Wages are chosen so as to maximize the product of each partner's net
return from agreement and cooperation. The Nash solution N to the problem dened by the
set of feasible allocations 
 and the disagreement point d is dened as:
N(
;d) = fx 2 
j9w;x = X(w) and w = argmax
w






(J(w)   V )(E(w)   U) (9)
This solution is the only one that satises the four following axioms:
 Pareto-Optimality (PAR)
 Symmetry (SYM)
 Invariance to equivalent utility representation (INV)
 Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
The rst two axioms, (PAR) and (SYM), are common to all the bargaining solutions we will
consider. They are detailed in great depth inter alia in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and
Thomson (1994). Roughly speaking, they indicate, respectively, that no party can be made
better o without harming the other (PAR) and that the solution is invariant to a permutation
in the players (SYM). The third axiom (INV), scale invariance or invariance to equivalent utility
representation, implies that the solution is invariant under positive ane transformations. This
property is inherited from the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility specication. It prevents basing
compromises on interpersonal comparisons of utility. The fourth and last axiom is by far the most
controversial.9 Generally speaking, the contraction independence or independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) states that the outcome of a bargain (in our context, the bargained wage)
should remain the same if the set of feasible agreements shrinks and still encompasses the initial
solution.
The Nash solution is represented on Figure 1. The solution to the bargaining problem
satises a tangency condition between the Nash curve and the Pareto frontier.
9The next two solutions do not use the Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. See below for a
detailed presentation of these solutions.15
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Figure 1 about here
Under Nash bargaining, the aggregate equilibrium wage is given by (see Appendix A):
w
N = rU +
1
2
(y   rV   rU) (10)
3.3 The Egalitarian solution
The origin of this solution is reputedly dicult to trace back. Arguments in favor of this solution
are detailed with attention in Kalai (1977). The solution is characterized by equal gains for both
parties. Wages are chosen so as to give an equal return from reaching an agreement. This concept
is central to social choice economics and aims at endowing each agent with exactly the same
welfare. The solution does not preserve all the axioms from the traditional Nash solution. As
brie
y mentioned above, the contraction independence has come under a lot of criticism. In the
Egalitarian case this axiom is replaced by a strong monotonicity axiom (MON). It should be
noted that contrary to the Nash solution, this solution is not scale invariant (see e.g. Thomson




 Strong monotonicity (MON)
The Egalitarian solution performs best from the viewpoint of monotonicity. The strong mono-
tonicity (MON) axiom states that all players should benet from an expansion of the feasible
set irrespective of whether the expansion is biased toward a particular player. This solution
satises:
E(
;d) = fx 2 
j9w;x = X(w) and (J(w)   V ) = (E(w)   U)g (11)
The Egalitarian solution is represented on Figure 2 and is given by the intersection between the
Pareto frontier and the 45 line.
Figure 2 about here
The aggregate equilibrium wage is then dened by (see Appendix A):
w
E = rU +
1
2
(y   rV   rU) (12)16
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3.4 The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) is characterized by equal proportional concessions for
both agents from their respective most favored bargaining points, called utopia points. For each
agent, this utopia point is dened by the maximum utility attainable subject to the constraint
that no agent should receive less than her status-quo utility.
KS(
;d) = d + (x   d) (13)
where  = maxf 2 <jd + (x   d) 2 
g and where x, the utopia point, denotes the pair
of best individual outcomes in 
 for each agent. From an axiomatic perspective, this solution
is in many aspects similar to the Nash solution except as regards the contraction independence
axiom. This axiom is replaced here with an individual monotonicity (IM) axiom. This solution
is the only one that satises the following four axioms:
 Pareto-Optimality (PAR)
 Symmetry (SYM)
 Invariance to equivalent utility representation (INV)
 Individual Monotonicity (IM)
The individual monotonicity (IM) axiom states that an expansion of the feasible set biased
toward a particular player always benets her. This monotonicity axiom is therefore weaker
than that of the Egalitarian case.
In the particular case of the KS solution, the rst diculty we are confronted with stems
from the denition of the utopian ideal. This denition appears to be crucial since it aects the
very nature of the disagreement points for each player. As has already been emphasized, the
disagreement points are determined by the fall-back or status-quo position each player faces. In
our framework, these positions are given by the expected utility of unemployment for a worker
and the expected value of a vacancy for a rm. Yet these two values are themselves aected
by the expectations of the agents about the labor market equilibrium. In what follows, in the
case of a failure both parties return to their searching activities and expect to earn or to pay
the equilibrium aggregate wage. Such an expectation is encompassed in the utopia point, which
is therefore dened as pragmatic. However, a more radical denition of utopia could have been
retained. In such a case, a breakdown in the bargaining leads both parties to expect to earn or
to pay the utopian wage in the next match, i.e. the highest possible wage for the worker and
the lowest possible wage for the rm. However this case, which is dened as utterly utopian,
is dicult to justify. As a matter of fact, this denition leads rms to expect the market17
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wage to equal the reservation wage and conversely, workers to expect the market wage to equal
productivity. As both expectations are degenerate labor market equilibria, we will focus solely
on the more appealing pragmatic denition.
We therefore rewrite (4) and (6) to take into account the agents' most opportunistic expecta-
tion. Henceforth, b Xk will refer, by convention, to agent's k utopian expectations for X 2 fE;Jg
and k 2 fe;fg where e stands for employee and f for rm. Similarly, b wk refers to the utopian
wage for agent k. The rm's utopia solves:
r b Jf = y   b wf + s
h
V   b Jf
i
; (14)
where b Jf denotes the rm's most opportunistic expectation when it pays the utopian wage b wf.
The rm's utopia implies that the net surplus of the worker is nil. The rm appropriates all the
rent from the match so that the utopian wage (for the rm) is exactly equal to the reservation
wage rU. Formally, the wage is therefore equal to b wf = rU. On the worker's side, utopia solves:
r b Ee = b we + s
h
U   b Ee
i
; (15)
where b Ee denotes the worker's most opportunistic expectations when she gets the utopian wage
b we. The worker's utopia implies that the net surplus of the rm is nil. Hence, the worker seizes
all the rent from the match so that the utopian wage (for the worker) is exactly equal to y rV .
Formally, the wage is therefore equal to b we = y rV . The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satises:
J(w)   V
b Jf   V
=
E(w)   U
b Ee   U
(16)
The KS solution is represented on Figure 3. This solution is determined by the intercept between
the line that connects the disagreement point d = (V;U) and the utopian ideal





Figure 3 about here
The aggregate equilibrium wage is then dened by (see Appendix A):
w
KS = rU +
1
2
(y   rV   rU) (17)
4 Labor Market Equilibria and Properties
4.1 Job creation curve (Jc)
Firms enter the labor market until all prot opportunities from new jobs are exhausted. In
equilibrium, the rent from a vacant job is zero and the free-entry condition, V = 0, is satised.18
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Labor demand decreases in the expected or average wage w, in the interest rate r, in the job
destruction rate s and in the cost of a vacancy 
. Conversely, it increases in the labor productivity






4.2 Wage curves (wc)
In the previous section, we derived three aggregate wage equations. The Nash w
N, the Egali-
tarian w
E and the Kalai-Smorodinsky w
KS wage curves are dened by the relations (10), (12)
and (17), respectively. Under each solution, the wage increases in the labor productivity, y, in
the real return, z and in the advertising cost, 
. The three wage curves are upward sloping in




wcj > 0, for j 2 fN;E;KSg. For
the sake of parsimony, we restrict our analysis to symmetric bargaining. All three solutions
(Nash, Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky) have their counterpart in the asymmetric case and
our results remains under these generalizations. The Nash solution becomes the Generalized
or Weighted Nash solution, the Egalitarian solution becomes the Proportional solution and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution becomes the Weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
4.3 Equilibria
Denition 1. A labor market equilibrium with perfectly transferable utility is made up of the
labor market tightness, , dened by (18), and a wage equation, w
j, for all j 2 fN;E;KSg,
dened by one of (10), (12) or (17). In other words, the labor market equilibrium is determined
in the (;w)-space by:
 the intercept of the curves dened by (10) and (18) if the wage is bargained according to
the Nash criterion.
 the intercept of the curves dened by (12) and (18) if the wage is bargained according to
the Egalitarian criterion.
 the intercept of the curves dened by (17) and (18) if the wage is bargained according to
the Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion.
The labor market equilibria are represented on Figure 4. It is worth noting that when utility is
perfectly transferable, the three wage equations have exactly the same shape (upward sloping19
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and linear) in the (;w)-space.10
Figure 4 about here
4.4 Properties
Proposition 1. Equivalence. In a steady-state equilibrium with perfectly transferable utility,









Proof. Straightforward, using the free entry condition, V = 0, and noting that the reservation
wage is equal to rU = z + 
.
It follows that there is a single labor market equilibrium (;w) compatible with the three
solutions that yields an unique equilibrium unemployment rate. This result show that when
the boundary of the feasible set is linear, any scale invariant solution gives the same answer as
Nash. Proposition 1 thus establishes a strict equivalence result between the three wage rules in
the canonical search and matching model.
When the labor market has matching frictions, the tightness is not necessarily ecient due
to trade externalities between rms and workers. Otherwise stated, one extra hiring rm makes
workers better o and leaves other rms worse o. Conversely, one additional searching worker
makes rms better o and leaves other workers worse o. In our benchmark economy, the
objective of the benevolent social planner consists in maximizing total production with respect
to  subject to the same matching constraint on labor market 
ows as the decentralized economy.
For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the case where r ! 0, thereby ignoring
transitional dynamics. The objective of the planner simplies to 11:
max
f; ug
  = (1   u)y   u
 (20)
subject to eq. (2). The instantaneous social output is made up of the market return of productive
job-worker pairs, (1   u)y, minus the aggregate search costs 
 = u
. Two remarks must be
made when utility is perfectly transferable. First, the planner is not concerned by distributional
issues. Wages and unemployment benets are consequently excluded from the social welfare
function. Second,   is similar here to a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function and since
10A formal characterization of the labor market equilibria is given in Appendix C.
11Note that we previously normalized the utility of leisure/home production to zero.20
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the planner has no aversion to inequity (by assumption),   is reduced to an Utilitarian welfare
function.
Therefore the critical point here is to assess whether the decentralized (bargaining) equilibria
is socially ecient, i.e. whether the social welfare is maximized or not. In the canonical search
and matching model, it is well established that a necessary condition for a decentralized equilib-
rium with Nash bargaining to be ecient, is given by the so-called Hosios-Diamond-Pissarides
(HDP hereafter) condition. Technically, this condition implies that the elasticity of the matching
function with respect to unemployment must be equal to the bargaining power of the worker. It
translates into  = 1
2 in our symmetric setup where  is the elasticity of the matching function.
The economy is said to be constrained ecient if the HDP condition holds. By virtue of Propo-
sition 1, when utility is perfectly transferable, this result generalizes to the Egalitarian and the
KS wage rules. An additional condition for eciency is that the equilibrium is not aected by
unemployment benets, z. It follows that social output is maximized under the three bargaining
solutions when the HDP condition is fullled and z = 0. The following proposition summarizes
this point.
Proposition 2. Eciency. When utility is perfectly transferable, z = 0, and the economy is
constrained ecient, the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions all maximize
social welfare. It follows that job creation and unemployment are socially ecient whatever the
bargaining solution considered.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that when congestion/search externalities are internalized in a de-
centralized equilibrium, then the market creates an ecient number of jobs and yields a socially
optimal unemployment rate. For instance, Hosios (1990) argues in his seminal paper that under
perfectly transferable utility, none of the results should depend on any particular rationalization
for the wage.12 Our results generalize Hosios' results to the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Egalitarian
bargaining solutions.
To complete the comparison between the three bargaining solutions, we now turn to some
classical comparative statics exercises. The critical point here is to check whether or not the
results provided by Gerber and Upmann (2006) hold in the standard search and matching
framework. Recall that these authors argue that under fairly mild conditions economic policy
implications (e.g. a change in the reservation wage) hinge entirely on the bargaining solution
12In his seminal article, Hosios (1990) considers the Nash solution only under perfectly transferable (linear)
utility. See Hosios (1990) p. 283.21
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considered. The next proposition summarizes the comparative statics results for the key exoge-
nous (policy) parameters.
Proposition 3. Comparative statics. Whatever the bargaining solution considered:
 The aggregate wage increases in the match productivity y and in the real return z, and
decreases in the vacancy cost 
, the interest rate r, and in the destruction rate s.
 The labor market tightness increases in the match productivity y, and decreases in the real
return z, in the vacancy cost 
, in the interest rate r, and in the destruction rate s.
Proof. See Appendix E.
By virtue of Proposition 1, it is easy to conclude that modeling wage setting through the Nash,
the Egalitarian or the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution does not aect the sign or the value
of the derivative of the wage or the tightness with respect to the main exogenous variables. The
usual results apply (see Pissarides, 2000). Comparative statics results are summarized in Table 4
of Appendix E.
Hence, the three preceding propositions stress the strict equivalence between the bargaining
solutions in the standard search and matching model when utility is perfectly transferable. This
last assumption is fairly standard and from this standpoint, using one solution rather than
another one seems to be neutral. This obviously runs counter to the arguments developed by
Gerber and Upmann (2006). Where does the divergence between the two models come from?
We will examine this issue in the next section.
5 Matching Under Partially Transferable Utility
So far, we have restricted the analysis to the case of perfectly transferable utility between the
rms and the workers. In the previous development, such an assumption consists in assuming a
linear utility function for each player in the bargaining games. This hypothesis is fairly standard
in the search and matching literature (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000 and Rogerson et al., 2005), and
amounts to assuming complete nancial markets where workers may fully insure against income
variation and unemployment hazard. In this section, we relax this hypothesis and consider the
case where risk averse workers have no access to nancial markets. In this slightly modied
framework, we characterize the three dierent solutions when utility is partially transferable13
13The case of partially transferable utility has recently attracted much attention in search equilibrium models
of the marriage market {see for instance Coles and Burdett (1997) and Burdett and Wright (1998){ but none of
these papers have considered solution concepts other than that of Nash.22
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and proceed to the comparison with the benchmark economy. It is worth noting that the job
creation equation (18) is invariant to workers' preferences. For that reason and for parsimony's
sake, we impose from the start the free entry condition so that the value of a vacancy is nil,
V = 0.
5.1 Equilibrium Wages
Workers' preferences are now represented with a concave instantaneous von Neumann and Mor-
genstern utility function. Risk averse workers want to smooth utility across states. Within the
scope of expected utility and when the rm and the worker bargain on wages, any increase in
the degree of the worker's risk aversion strengthens the rm's position in the negotiation. Risk
aversion reduces the set of feasible allocations 
 and modies the shape of the Pareto frontier
as depicted on the gures below. Note that it is also possible to alter the shape of the Pareto
frontier by considering other institutional wage setting agreements. However, assuming risk
aversion is more adapted to our model and is of particular relevance when dealing with e.g. op-
timal unemployment insurance policy (see for example Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001 or Coles
and Masters, 2006). In addition and as shown by Burdett and Wright (1998), it should be kept
in mind that two-sided search with non-transferable or partially transferable utility may lead
to multiple equilibria. However, the simple per period payo or utility assumed in this paper
provides a sucient condition for uniqueness and rules out the possibility of multiple equilibria
(see for instance Burdett and Wright, 1998, Proposition 2, for a formal statement).
Nash: The solution to the bargaining game still satises a tangency condition between the
Nash curve and the Pareto frontier. Under Nash bargaining with non transferable utility, the
aggregate equilibrium wage is implicitly dened by (see Appendix A for details):
v(w)   v(z)
v0(w)
= y   w + 
: (21)
Figure 5 about here
The Nash solution with partially transferable utility is represented in Figure 5. The aggregate
wage is set so as to equalize the workers' net utility gains (the left hand side) and the rms'
prots (the right hand side). Workers' attitude toward risk has a direct impact on the left hand
side of the wage equation and reduces the utility gap between wage and real return z. Thus, as
the worker's risk aversion increases, the rm is able to hoard a greater share of the surplus and
bargains over a smaller wage.23
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Egalitarian: Under the Egalitarian solution the aggregate equilibrium wage is implicitly dened
by (see Appendix A for details):
v(w)   v(z) = y   w + 
: (22)
A straight comparison between (21) and (22) clearly shows the importance of the scale invariance
property. Under the Nash solution, the workers' net utility, v(w)   v(z), is normalized (scaled)
by the wage's marginal utility, v0(w). This produces scale invariance to ane transformations of
utility in the classical Arrow-Pratt sense. Under the egalitarian solution, the workers' net utility
is not normalized. Accordingly, the solution depends on the marginal utility of the outcome,
i.e. on the utility's scaling. It is therefore necessary to assume a given arbitrary normalization
for utility. In this case, we assume that the workers agree with the rm on the marginal utility
value of labor productivity y, hence v0(y) = 1. The following lemma and propositions reassess
the equivalence result when workers are risk averse.
Lemma 3. When utility is partially transferable (workers are risk averse), the Nash and the
Egalitarian solutions are no longer equivalent.
The non equivalence between the two solutions originates from the scale invariance property of
the Nash solution. Put dierently, when workers are risk neutral, the marginal utility of the
wage is equal to unity and the two solutions collapse to a single one. This does not hold true
when workers are risk averse.
Kalai-Smorodinsky: Under the KS solution the aggregate equilibrium wage is implicitly de-
ned as a function of the reservation wage rU (see Appendix A for details):
v(w)   rU
v (y)   rU
 
y   v 1 (rU)

= y   w (23)
Figure 6 about here
The Kalai-Smorodinsky with non transferable utility is represented in Figure 6. It is worth
remarking that homogeneity in v(:) of equation (23) ensures that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
remains scale invariant. In order to compare the Kalai-Smorodinsky and the Nash solutions,14
it is convenient to rewrite (21) as:
v(w) rU
v0(w) = y  w. Comparing the latter expression with (23),
it is easy to note that the two solutions dier.
Lemma 4. When risk-averse workers' utility is partially transferable, the Nash and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solutions are in general no longer equivalent.
14Under the Nash solution, when utility is partially transferable, the reservation wage rewrites as rU = v(z) +

v
0(w). Using this latter expression together with (21), the expression in the core of the text follows. For further
details see Appendix A.24
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More accurately, the non equivalence originates from the discrepancy between v0(w) and
v(y) rU
y v 1(rU),
and there is, a priori, no reason for these two expressions to be identical. Note however that if y
and v 1(rU) (which dene the upper and lower bounds of feasible wages) are suciently close,
then
v(y) v(v 1(rU))
y v 1(rU) is a rst order approximation of v0(x) at the reservation wage x = v 1(rU).
If the wage under the Nash solution is suciently close to the reservation wage, the dierence
between the two solutions tends to vanish. In other words, the discrepancy between the two
solutions is conditioned by their position within the range of feasible wages and the curvature
of the utility function. Finally, putting all elements together and remarking that the egalitarian
solution can be rewritten as v(w) rU = y w, it is possible to summarize the preceding results.
Proposition 4. Equivalence. When utility is partially transferable, the Nash, the Egalitarian
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions dier and the equivalence result collapses.
Beyond that we cannot say much more about the dierences between the three bargaining
solutions from a qualitative standpoint, at least in their general forms. The key point is to
evaluate the quantitative relevance of these dierences which are themselves determined by the
shape of the Pareto frontier. We will discuss these considerations in the next section and return
for the moment to the eciency and comparative statics issues.
5.2 Labor Market Equilibria
In the benchmark model, whatever the bargaining solution, the wage curves all have the same
shape, i.e. they are upward sloping and linear in the (;w)-space. When utility is partially
transferable, things turn out to be dierent. We have already established that the three solutions
are no longer equivalent. We can also characterize the dierence between the solutions. The
shapes of the wage curves are now dierent. More precisely, when utility is partially transferable,
all the wage curves are upward sloping and the Nash, the Egalitarian and the KS wage curves are
respectively convex, concave and convex in (;w)-space.15 The Job creation curve is unaected
in our updated framework. A set of possible labor market equilibria when utility is partially
transferable is represented in Figure 7.
Insert Figure 7 about Here
Note that with partially transferable utility, it is not possible to establish a systematic hierarchy
in the wage or in the labor market tightness. As a consequence, the labor market equilibria may
15Formal proofs are provided in Appendix C.25
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be ordered dierently than in gure 7, although the current gure is consistent with the main
results presented in section 5.4.
5.3 Properties
With partially transferable utility, the production criterion as emphasized in the linear case is
non longer equivalent to the Utilitarian criterion. As in the benchmark model, we restrict to
the case r ! 0. Following e.g. Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) or Lehmann and van der
Linden (2007), we assume that a benevolent social planner will choose the optimal allocation
that maximizes an Utilitarian criterion subject to matching constraints and to an aggregate
resource constraint. The benevolent social planner controls the tightness, the wages and the
unemployment benets. The social planner's objective simplies to:
max
f;u;w;zg
  = (1   u)v(w) + uv(z) (24)
subject to eq. (2) and (1 u)w+uz = (1 u)y u
. The welfare function,  , is made up of the
instantaneous utility of employed and unemployed workers weighted by their respective mass.
The rst constraint is similar to the one used in the benchmark model and underlines the fact
that the planner faces the same matching constraints as the decentralized economy. The last
constraint simply states that a feasible allocation must satisfy an aggregate resource constraint.
The planner problem is detailed in Appendix D. A key property of the rst-best allocation
is perfect insurance. The planner sets wages and unemployment benets in such a way that
v0(w) = v0(z). This perfect insurance property implies that workers are wage takers. Hence,
as has already been shown by e.g. Lehmann and van der Linden (2007), unless workers have
no bargaining power (i.e. the workers are paid their reservation wage), the rst-best optimum
cannot be reached through decentralized bargaining. Of course, none of the wage agreements in
this paper satises such a rule. The next proposition summarizes the arguments when utility is
partially transferable.
Proposition 5. Eciency. When utility is partially transferable and the economy is con-
strained ecient, the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions do not maxi-
mize social welfare unless workers are assumed to be wage takers. It follows that in the general
case, job creation and unemployment are socially inecient whatever the bargaining solution
considered.
Proof. see Appendix D.
Propositions 2 and 5 characterize the rst-best allocation in the two specications of the
model, although the formal conditions dier signicantly. As discussed by Lehmann and van26
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der Linden (2007), the dierence stems from the fact that the planner is not concerned with
distributional issues when utility is perfectly transferable. As a consequence, there is a mul-
tiplicity of rst-best allocations, characterized by a combination of w and z, maximizing total
production net of the vacancy costs. The constrained ecient benchmark economy with z = 0
corresponds to a particular optimum among all the rst-best allocations. Contrary to the trans-
ferable case, when utility is partially transferable, the planner pays attention to the manner in
which output is distributed among workers and perfectly insures workers against income risk.
This perfect insurance property makes bargaining considerations irrelevant from a rst-best
perspective. Consequently any bargained wage would lead to inecient outcomes. In what
follows, we focus on the second-rank characteristics of the bargaining solutions using the welfare
function  .
Under Nash or Egalitarian bargaining, it is easy to establish direct comparative statics inferences.
The next proposition shows that proposition 3 easily extends to the case of partially transferable
utility for both bargaining solutions.
Proposition 6. Comparative statics: Nash and Egalitarian. Given Nash or Egalitarian
bargaining:
 The equilibrium wage is increasing in the match productivity y and in the real return z,
and decreasing in the vacancy cost 
, the interest rate r, and in the destruction rate s.
 The labor market tightness is increasing in the match productivity y, and decreasing in the
real return z, in the vacancy cost 
, in the interest rate r, and in the destruction rate s.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Hence, it turns out that from a qualitative viewpoint the comparative statics eects are identical
for the two solutions considered. Recalling that the unemployment rate is decreasing in the labor
market tightness, Proposition 6 shows that equilibrium employment increases in y and decreases
in z;
;r and s. In particular, it is worth noting that a rise in the real return z (which increases
the reservation utility rU and subsequently the reservation wage v 1(rU)) unambiguously raises
the unemployment rate in both cases. This result runs counter to the arguments proposed by
Gerber and Upmann (2006) as regards the Egalitarian solution.16
The comparative statics properties under the KS solution are harder to characterize. As a
matter of fact, the equilibrium wage is an implicit function of the reservation utility rU, which
16For instance, see Gerber and Upmann (2006, pp. 171-172).27
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r + s + q ()
v (z) +
q ()
r + s + q ()
v (w) (25)
Together with the job creation condition (18) and the wage equation (23), equation (25) denes
the labor market equilibrium under the KS solution. Unfortunately, in its general form the KS
solution is not easily tractable. To derive analytical results, we proceed to a rst-order Taylor
expansion in the neighborhood of the linear/transferable case. Consequently, it must be borne
in mind that the results apply essentially to a reasonably low degree of worker risk aversion.
However, it can be demonstrated that the Nash and the KS solutions are indiscernible in a rst-
order approximation.17 We show in Appendix E that the Nash and the KS solutions behave
identically under fairly mild conditions. The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 7. Comparative statics: Kalai-Smorodinsky. Given the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution in the neighborhood of the transferable utility case and under fairly mild conditions:
 The equilibrium wage is increasing in the match productivity y and in the real return z,
and decreasing in the vacancy cost 
, the interest rate r, and in the destruction rate s.
 The labor market tightness is increasing in the match productivity y, and decreasing in the
real return z, in the vacancy cost 
, in the interest rate r, and in the destruction rate s.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Proposition 7 shows that from a qualitative standpoint the Nash and the KS solutions behave
identically in the neighborhood of the linear/transferable case. Again, this contradicts Gerber
and Upmann (2006). When utility is non transferable, the Nash and the KS solutions are no
longer equivalent however an accumulation of evidence suggests that the discrepancy between
the two solutions is small. In the next section, we proceed to a series of numerical exercises in
order to further evaluate the generality of our arguments.
5.4 Quantitative Implications
So far it has been established that with partially transferable utility the equivalence result
between the three bargaining solutions vanishes. In addition, it has been shown that in general
the solutions behave identically at least in the neighborhood of linearity. The purpose here is to
determine the qualitative and quantitative implications of the model in its general form when
17See Appendix B for a formal proof. The two solutions dier however in the second-order. In consequence, the
quantitative dierences between the two solutions are likely to be second-order dierences which is also consistent
with the discussion in the previous section.28
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utility is partially transferable. We proceed in three steps. First, we parameterize the model and
compare the three solutions. Second, we search for the degree of risk aversion that maximizes
the distance between the solutions, in particular as regards the Nash and the KS solutions.
Third, we evaluate the sensitivity of the model to variations in the key exogenous parameters.
Numerical Illustrations: The baseline parameter values are chosen with two criteria in mind:
(i) the values of the parameters themselves have to be realistic and coherent with the values
usually chosen in the literature; (ii) the values of the endogenous variable that follow from these
parameters also have to be reasonable. The parameters used here are in the range of those
usually chosen in the matching literature (see e.g. Shimer, 2005). We normalize the time period
to be a quarter. The discount rate, r, is set to 1:25%. A matching function of the Cobb-Douglas
form is assumed such that M(u;v) = ku#v1 #, where k is a mismatch parameter, # and 1 # are
the elasticities of the matching function with respect to search inputs. We assume # to be equal
to 1
2 (see e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). As is traditional in the literature, parameter k
may be used as a calibration parameter to pin down the equilibrium unemployment rate. We
set this parameter to unity. The values of leisure and the recruiting costs are set to z = 0:4 and

 = 0:27, respectively. The job productivity is normalized to unity. We assume a CRRA utility




1    0;  6= 1
lnx  = 1
(26)
where  is the coecient of relative risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. We take the sym-
metric Nash bargaining solution under transferable utility as a benchmark. Note that in the
benchmark model the economy is constrained ecient since the bargaining power of the work-
ers is equal to the elasticity of the matching function. The baseline parameter values and the
resulting endogenous variables are reported in Table 1.
Parameters y s z 
 r k
1 0:1 0:4 0:27 0:0125 1
Endogenous variables  w u
1:91 0:9580 6:75%
Table 1: Baseline parameter values and equilibrium labor market values with symmetric Nash
Bargaining and transferable utility.
Table 2 presents the labor market equilibrium values for the three bargaining solutions. We
contrast two cases in terms of risk aversion: low risk aversion ( = 0:5) and high risk aversion
( = 1:5). In the rst case the curvature of the utility function is small whereas in the second
the curvature is more pronounced. This range of values is appropriate with the topic at stake
here, though much higher values can be found in the macroeconomic literature: in decision29
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under risk, utility is an interval scale, unique up to unit and level and all information relevant
to this interval scale can be captured by the index of absolute risk aversion (Pratt, 1964 and
Wakker, 2008). For a CRRA function, this index is equal to =x. A consequence is that the
empirical meaning of the value of the CRRA coecient depends on the corresponding outcome
domain dened for x. For high amounts of money, large values (up to 50 or 100) are required to
generate enough curvature. For small domains, as is the case in this paper, moderate parameter
values are sucient to generate the same absolute degree of risk aversion.
For each solution and each risk level, we report the equilibrium values for the wage, w, the
tightness, , the unemployment rate, u, and a measure of the Welfare,  , which here is similar
to an Utilitarian criterion.18
 = 0:5 w  u  
Nash 0:9538 2:3183 6:16% 1:9156
Egalitarian 0:9532 2:3738 6:09% 1:9156
Kalai-Smorodinsky 0:9538 2:3180 6:16% 1:9156
 = 1:5 w  u  
Nash 0:9429 3:5281 5:05%  2:1093
Egalitarian 0:9404 3:8527 4:85%  2:1095
Kalai-Smorodinsky 0:9430 3:5274 5:06%  2:1093
Table 2: Equilibrium values for the three bargaining solutions and for two risk aversion's levels
( = 0:5 is low risk aversion;  = 1:5 is high risk aversion)
The rst noticeable result is that for any degree of risk aversion, the quantitative dierence
between the Nash and the KS solution is immaterial. With low risk aversion, the small curvature
of the utility function makes the dierence between the two solutions non-existent (for further
details see the discussion in subsection 5.1). Therefore when utility is partially transferable and
when a low degree of risk aversion is involved, the equivalence result remains. With high risk
aversion, the large curvature of the utility function creates a second-order dierence between
the two solutions. However, for reasonable parameter values, the dierence as regards the
labor market can be disregarded. Hence, although the two solutions dier (widely) from a
theoretical viewpoint when utility is partially transferable, the quantitative discrepancies appear
insignicant.
The results diverge more signicantly as regards the Egalitarian solution. As detailed in
subsection 5.1, the bargaining outcome from the Egalitarian solution depends on marginal utility
and diers from the other two scale invariant solutions. For any degree of risk aversion, the
wage and the tightness are lower and higher, respectively, under the Egalitarian solution, hence
resulting in a lower unemployment rate. Perhaps surprisingly, the welfare tends to be smaller
18Formally this criterion satises:   = (1   u)rE + (1   u)rJ + vrV + urU.30
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despite a lower unemployment rate. For the sake of clarity, let us recall that the instantaneous
Utilitarian criterion may be written as (1   u)(y   w) + (1   u)v(w) + uv(z)   u
. As can be
inferred from Table 2, the Egalitarian solution is more responsive in the tightness than the Nash
or the KS solutions. It follows that the last term matters more, hence a more pronounced eect
on welfare. Finally and perhaps trivially, one can note that whatever the bargaining solution
considered, a higher degree of risk aversion implies a lower wage and a higher labor market
tightness.
Maximum Dierence: We now proceed with the analysis of the model for admittedly plausible
values of  in the range [0;2]. Chetty (2006), for instance, nds bounds on the Arrow-Pratt
coecient of relative risk aversion  and estimates that this coecient should be smaller than
2 and is supposedly close to 1. Over the range considered, the dierence between the Nash
and the Egalitarian solutions is monotonic whereas the dierence between the Nash and the KS
solutions is non-monotonic.19 Here we restrict ourselves to the latter dierence. It has been
established that although these two solutions dier from a theoretical viewpoint they are, under
partially transferable utility, arguably close. We search for the maximum discrepancy between
the two solutions for the model detailed above. One of the more noteworthy results here is that
with a CRRA utility function the Nash and the KS solutions coincide at the upper and the lower
bound of the interval considered. The following remark highlights this result.
Remark 1. With a CRRA utility function, the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are
reduced to a single solution when workers are risk neutral ( = 0) or strongly risk averse ( = 2).
Proof. For  = 0 the results follows directly by virtue of Proposition 1. For  = 2, we get
v(x) =  1=x, v0(x) = 1=x2 and v 1(x) =  1=x. Replacing in the wage equations as dened
in Appendix A for partially transferable utility, the solution to the bargaining problem veries
y =  rUw2.
The wage gaps wKS   wN (panel a) and wE   wN (panel b) are plotted in Figure 8 below for
 2 [0;2]. Over the range considered and for plausible parameter values, we have wKS  wN
and wN  wE, which is consistent with the labor market equilibria depicted in gures 4 and
7. On the rst panel, the wage gap is bell-shaped and maximized for  = 1:28. Note that the
maximum is quasi-invariant to small changes in the key parameters for the model specication
we have chosen. Two remarks can be made here. First, the quantitative parameterizations of
the model unambiguously show that the bargained wage under the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
is not always higher that the bargained wage under the Nash solution. This specic ranking
19See Appendix B for formal details. Numerical illustrations are given in Figure 8 below.31
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is restricted to a precise range of relative risk aversion coecients, namely [0;2]. Outside this
range, the ranking may be reversed. Second, the deviations from the perfectly transferable case
do not yield any systematic or monotonic relationship between risk aversion and the wage gap.
Insert Figure 8 about here
Steady-State Elasticities: The purpose here is to underline the quantitative eects of a change
in some key exogenous parameters. In particular, we are interested in the comparative-statics
eects of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution from both a qualitative and quantitative point of view.
We evaluate the responsiveness of the wage and the labor market tightness to a variation in: (i)
the labor productivity, y; (ii) the unemployed real return, z; (iii) the cost of a vacancy, 
; (iv) the
interest rate, r; and (v) the job separation rate, s. More precisely, we calculate the percentage
change in the endogenous variable in response to a 10% increase in the exogenous parameter. It
follows that "y=x 
dlogy
dlogx; 8x 2 fy; z; 
; s; rg and 8y 2 f; wg. Table 3 summarizes the
steady-state elasticities for the wage and the labor market tightness following a change in a key
parameter when the dierence between the Nash and the KS solutions is maximum for  = 1:28
as evaluated above. Note that with these two criteria we stress numerical congurations that
should exacerbate the discrepancies between the bargaining solutions especially as regards the
Nash and the KS solutions.
"w=y y z 
 r s
Nash 0:9866 0:0441  0:0291  0:0067  0:0529
Egalitarian 1:0346 0:0484  0:0321  0:0073  0:0584
Kalai-Smorodinsky 0:9866 0:0441  0:0291  0:0066  0:0529
"=y y z 
 r s
Nash 2:4154  1:4380  1:1049  0:0239  0:1908
Egalitarian 0:9365  1:5040  1:0614  0:0140  0:1119
Kalai-Smorodinsky 2:4153  1:4376  1:1051  0:0239  0:1912
Table 3: Steady-State elasticities for a 10% increase in the key exogenous parameters.
From Table 3, it can be pointed out that the comparative statics results of the KS solution in the
neighborhood of linearity as presented in Proposition 7 generalize under reasonable parameters
values in the neighborhood of linearity. It follows that the three bargaining solutions yield the
very same qualitative results. Furthermore, even in a conguration where the discrepancies
between the Nash and the KS solutions should be exacerbated, the dierence between the two
solutions appears to be intangible. This last point corroborates our previous results. Finally,
the Egalitarian solution appears to be more responsive to the change of the key parameters. In
particular, the elasticities of the wage and the tightness to the labor productivity and the job
separation rate are magnied in comparison with the Nash and the KS solutions. Hence from32
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a macroeconomic viewpoint only the Egalitarian solution is likely to change the labor market
responses to aggregate turbulence.
6 Conclusion
In this article we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the eects of three
alternative and prominent bargaining solutions. We studied the Nash, the Egalitarian and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in a small rm's matching model of unemployment.
Our results are twofold. First, from a theoretical point of view, this paper is to the best of our
knowledge the rst contribution that attempts to implement and systematically compare the
outcome of the dierent solutions in a search and matching model of the labor market. Second,
we establish a series of results arising out of the dierent bargaining solutions considered. Our
results show that even though the traditional results of bargaining theory apply in the context
of search-matching economies, they are quantitatively weaker than expected. In particular,
we found no dierence in labor market outcomes between the Nash and the KS solutions.
This suggests that the results advocated by e.g. Gerber and Upmann (2006) in a McDonald-
Solow ecient contract model do not generalize to dynamic search-matching economies. A main
consequence is that the policy implications are not very sensitive to the choice of the bargaining
solution used to represents wage bargains on the labor market. A secondary consequence is
that the tractability of the Nash solution comes at low cost in the dominant search-matching
paradigm.33
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J(w) V = 0 and yields the following
sharing rules: E(w)   U = J(w)   V = 1
2S where S  E(w)   U + J(w)   V stands for the
surplus of a job-worker match. Using (4) and (6) together with the sharing rules, one gets
w   rU = y   w   rV ; eq. (10) follows.
Egalitarian solution: From (11), the Egalitarian solution translates into E(w) U = J(w) V .
Using (4) and (6) together with the latter expression, one gets w   rU = y   w   rV ; eq. (12)
follows.




b Jf(b wf) V . Using (4), (6),
(14) and (15) the LHS rewrites as w rU
y w rV and the RHS as
y rV  rU
y rV  rU. Making use of the last
two expressions, one gets w rU
y w rV = 1; eq. (17) follows.
A.2 Model under partially transferable utility






J(w) V = 0 and simplies to
v0(w)(J(w)   V ) = (E(w)   U). One gets the following two sharing rules E(w) U =
v0(w)
v0(w)+1S
and J(w)   V = 1
v0(w)+1S with S  E(w)   U + J(w)   V . Using (4) and (6), one gets
J(w)   V =
y w rV
r+s and S =
y+v(w) w r(U+V )
r+s . Combining these two relations with the shar-
ing rules and assuming the free entry condition is satised yields, w = y   1
v0(w) (v(w)   rU).
A more suitable wage equation can be derived using (3), (5) and the rst order condition of
the Nash program. Combining these relations and restricting to symmetric equilibria gives
rU = v(z) + 
v0(w). Replacing this in the previous expression of w, eq. (21) follows.
Egalitarian solution: From (11), the Egalitarian solution translates into E(w) U = J(w) V .
Multiplying both sides by r+s, using (4), (6) and assuming that the free-entry condition, V = 0,
is satised, one gets: y   w = v(w)   rU. Next, combining (3) and (4), the expected return
from unemployment veries rU =
(r+s)v(z)+q()v(w)
r+s+q() . Finally, combining the last two equations,
eq. (22) follows.




b Jf(b wf) V . Using (4), (6),
(14) and (15), the LHS satises: E U
J =
v(w) rU





Combining these relations gives (v(w)   rU)
 
y   v 1 (rU)

= (v (y)   rU)(y   w). Finally,




y   v 1 (rU)

.ECB
Working Paper Series No 1359
July 2011 37
B Equilibrium analysis in the neighborhood of transferability
The purpose of this appendix is to study the properties of the labor market equilibrium in the
neighborhood of a linear utility function. This is of particular interest for the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution which is dicult to characterize in its general form. The utility function v(w;) will be
a function of a parameter , which will be positively linked to the risk aversion; in particular,
 = 0 will correspond to the linear utility case: v(w;0) = w, and we require that risk aversion
be strictly increasing in .
Let  be such that v(;) = rU with rU =
(r+s)v(z;)+q()v(w;)
r+s+q() . We can rewrite this as
v(w;)   v(;) = r+s
q() (v(;)   v(z;)). Then, using the Job Creation condition (18), one
gets:




(v(;)   v(z;)) (B-1)
The wage equations detailed in Appendix A rewrite as:
y   w = [v(w;)   v(;)]
1
v0(w)
y   w = v(w;)   v(;)
y   w = [v(w;)   v(;)]
y   
v (y;)   v(;)
(B-2)
for the Nash, Egalitarian, and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, respectively. For consistency and
notational convenience, v0(w) corresponds to @v=@w. For every value of the risk aversion param-
eter, the equilibrium is then given by a triplet (w;;) which is implicitly dened by a system
Hi(w;;;) = 0 made up of equations (18), (B-1) and a wage equation (B-2) corresponding to
the solution considered. i 2 fN;E;KSg stands for Nash, Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky,
respectively.
When  = 0, the three solutions coincide, and we will write this solution under transferability
as (w0;0;0); we have Hi(w0;0;0;0) = 0 for all i. Using the implicit function theorem, it is














By using the explicit solution in the case of transferability 0 = z + 
0 and w0 = 1
2(y + 0) =
1
2(y + z + 











@(z;0)   (w0   z) @2v
@@w(w0;0)






























q(0)2   2(r + s)q0(0)
(B-3)ECB
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The denominator of these three expressions is positive, as long as q0() < 0. With the assumption
that dv
d(w;) is increasing and concave in w (this assumption is typically satised for both the
CRRA and CARA utility functions), we have the general results that dw
djN < 0, dw
djE < 0, and
dw
djKS < 0.
We can thus characterize the equilibrium wage in the neighborhood of linearity with the
following Taylor approximation:








Consequently, under partial transferability, the equilibrium wage is lower in the Nash, Egal-
itarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky cases than in the linear case. We can also compare the relative
behavior of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as well as the relative behavior of Nash and
Egalitarian solutions. Using (B-3), we nd
wKS   wN 









q(0)2   2(r + s)q0(0)
(B-5)
However, even with our assumptions on the utility function, it is not possible to establish the
sign of this expression, and by using specic examples it can be shown that the dierence can
go in either directions. Thus there is no general result on the relative behavior of the Nash
and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions that can be established without further hypotheses. Similarly,
using (B-3), we nd
wE   wN 
(r + s)q0(0)(w0   z) @2v
@@w(w0;0)
q(0)2   2(r + s)q0(0)
(B-6)
This expression is of the sign of q0() and is, in consequence, negative. It follows that the wage
gap between the Egalitarian and the Nash solutions is increasing in absolute terms with .
C Characterization of the Job Creation and Wage Curves
Job Creation curve: Let   () =  
q0()
q() 2 [0;1] be the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to search inputs. Dierentiation of the job creation equation (18) with respect to






It follows that the Job Creation curve is decreasing in the (;w)-space.
Remark 2. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching function, as is traditional in the search-matching
literature, the Job creation curve, Jc, is decreasing and convex in the (;w)-space.ECB








 < 0, one obtains: d2
dw2
 
Jc =  (1   )q() d
dw > 0.
Wage curves: First, one must note that contrary to the Job Creation curve, the shape of the
wage curves are not invariant to workers' preferences. In consequence, the cases with transferable
and partially transferable utility need to be distinguished.
In the former case (transferable utility), the three bargaining solutions collapse to a single
wage equation. Dierentiation of (10), (12) or (17) with respect to the endogenous variables, 





d for j 2 fN;E;KSg (C-8)
It follows the wage curves are upward-sloping and linear in the (;w)-space.
In the latter case (partially transferable utility), the shape of the wage curves are not neces-
sarily the same. We proceed in the same manner for the three solutions below.
Remark 3. When utility is partially transferable, and under the condition that the Arrow-Pratt
measure of absolute risk aversion is not too decreasing, the Nash wage curve, wcN, is increasing

























For this to be positive, it is enough that the absolute risk aversion  v00(w)=v0(w) is lower
than half the absolute prudence  v000(w)=v00(w).
Remark 4. When utility is partially transferable, the Egalitarian wage curve, wcE, is increasing












Remark 5. When utility is partially transferable, the Kalai-Smorodinsky wage curve, wcKS, is






Proof. The equations (23) and (25) implicitly determine w and rU as a function of . The system
of equations is simpler if we write  such that v() = rU, and () = (r + s)=(r + s + q()).
20Note however that under reasonable parameter values, the wage curve is convex in the (;w)-space.ECB
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By using the Implicit Function theorem, the partial derivative can be calculated and proven to






(v(w)   v(z))(v(w)   v() + (w   )v0())0()
(v(w)   v())( 1 + ())v0(w) + (v(y)   v() + ( w + y + (w   )())v0(w))v0()
Existence and Uniqueness:
When utility is perfectly transferable, the wage curves have all the same shape and are all












 < 0. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium follow.























wcKS > 0, and the







 < 0. Existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium follow from the slopes and the values of the two curves at z and at y.
D Eciency
D.1 Benchmark model
We restrict ourselves to the case where r ! 0. When utility is perfectly transferable, the social
welfare function corresponds to aggregate output. This function satises:
  = (1   u)y   u
 (D-9)
The program of the benevolent planner consists in maximizing   with respect to  subject to
eq. (2). The social planner chooses  such that:




 = 0 (D-10)
where    () 2 [0;1] is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the search
inputs. By virtue of Proposition 1, whatever the bargaining solution, the wage rule satises
eq. (19) when utility is transferable. Making use of this relation together with the job creation
condition (18), we rewrite the decentralized equilibrium as:
1
2





 = 0 (D-11)
Comparing the social optimum (D-10) with the decentralized equilibrium (D-11), it is simple
to establish that the two relationships are equivalent if and only if  = 1
2 and z = 0. In other
terms, job creation is socially ecient when the elasticity of the matching function is equal to
the bargaining power of the workers and unemployment benets are nil.ECB
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D.2 Model under partially transferable utility
We restrict ourselves to the case where r ! 0. When utility is non transferable. The social
welfare function writes:
  = (1   u)v(w) + uv(z) (D-12)
The program of the benevolent planner consists in maximizing   with respect to , w and z
subject to eq. (2) and to an aggregate resource constraint, (1 u)w+uz = (1 u)y 
u. This




s + q ()
v(w) +
s




s + q ()
w +
s
s + q ()
z  
q ()




s + q ()

where  is the multiplier associated with the second constraint. The rst order conditions with
respect to , w and z are respectively given by:
 [q ()(1   )w   q ()(1   )z   q ()(1   )y + 
s + 
q ()] = 0
v0(w) +  = 0
v0(z) +  = 0
From the last two focs, it's simple to get v0(w) = v0(z). Hence, the planner perfectly insures the
workers against unemployment hazard. The rst-best allocation is characterized by a perfect
insurance property which implies that the workers are wage takers, i.e. w = z. It follows that
any other wage-setting mechanisms are socially inecient. Generally-speaking, this includes the
three bargaining solutions considered in the paper.
E Comparative Statics
As already mentioned, the Job Creation curve does not depend on workers' preferences. Total














[dr + ds] (E-13)
where () 2 [0;1] is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the search inputs. As
regards the wage curves, we once again contrast two cases, i.e. transferable and non transferable
utility. The wage equations rewrite for j 2 fN;E;KSg under the following generic form:
Aj = y   w + 
 (E-14)ECB
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where j stands for the Nash (N), the Egalitarian (E) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS), solutions
respectively. Dierentiation of (E   14) wage curve with respect to the endogenous variables
































When utility is perfectly transferable, the three bargaining solutions collapse to a single wage
equation. We have Aj = w z for j 2 fN;E;KSg and eq. (E 14) rewrites as w z = y w+
.
For the three solutions, we get @Aj
@w = 1, @Aj




 = 0. Using the partial
derivatives together with (E-13) and (E-15), the comparative-statics results follow. The table
below summarizes the results.
Endogenous variable Bargaining solution y z 
 r s
Nash +        
 (tightness) Egalitarian +        
Kalai-Smorodinsky +        
Nash + +      
w (wage) Egalitarian + +      
Kalai-Smorodinsky + +      
Table 4: Comparative statics results when utility is perfectly transferable.
E.2 Model under partially transferrable utility
When utility is partially transferable, the three bargaining solutions are no longer equivalent.
We proceed with the analysis of the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions
separately. In the rst two cases, the comparative statics results established when utility is
perfectly transferable readily extend to the case of partially transferable utility. Things turn out
be to be a little more complicated as regards the KS solution which depends on rU (see below).
Nash solution: Under the Nash solution, we have AN = (v(w)   v(z))=v0(w) and eq. (E  14)
rewrites as (v(w)   v(z))=v0(w) = y   w + 

















 = 0. Using the partial derivatives together with (E-13) and
(E-15), the comparative-statics results follow. Table 5 summarizes the results.
Egalitarian solution: Under the Egalitarian solution we have AE = (v(w)   v(z)) and eq. (E 
14) rewrites as (v(w)   v(z)) = y   w + 
. We get @AE
@w = v0(w) > 0, @AE





 = 0. Using the partial derivatives together with (E-13) and (E-15), the
comparative-statics results follow. Table 5 summarizes the results.ECB
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Kalai-Smorodinsky solution: Under the KS solution we have AKS =
(v(w) rU)(y v 1(rU))+
(v(y) rU)




y   w + 
. In its general form, the KS solution is not tractable. In order to derive analytical
results, we restrict our analysis to the neighborhood of the linearity which make the results
appropriate for a low degree of risk aversion. We consider now the following approximation of
the utility function: v(w) = w   w2 + o(). Solving for  in (B-1), then for w in (B-2), and






2(y + z + 
)   









Using the implicit function theorem and matrix notations with x = (y;











Let  =  
h
( 2 +  (y + 
   z))q ()
2 + 4rq0 ()
i







































































   z) < 1, we know that  > 0 since q0() < 0 and we have dw




 < 0, dw
dr < 0 and dw
ds < 0, as well as d
dy > 0, d
dz < 0, d
d
 < 0, d
dr < 0 and d
ds < 0. As the
derivation requires  ' 0, the condition will hold for  that is small enough.ECB
Working Paper Series No 1359
July 2011 44
Endogenous variable Bargaining solution y z 
 r s
Nash +        
 (tightness) Egalitarian +        
Kalai-Smorodinsky +        
Nash + +      
w (wage) Egalitarian + +      
Kalai-Smorodinsky + +      
Table 5: Comparative statics results when utility is partially transferable utility; in the neigh-

























Figure 1: Nash solution with transferable utility.ECB























































b Jf; b Ee

Figure 3: Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with transferable utility.ECB



















Figure 5: Nash solution with partially transferable utility.ECB
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Figure 7: Labor market equilibria with partially transferable utility; N for Nash, E for Egalitar-
ian, KS for Kalai-Smorodinsky; Wages and Tightness are ranked as shown in Table 2; Hierarchy
in the endogenous variables for the three solutions may be mathematically established in the
neighborhood of linearity. Proofs are available from the authors upon request.ECB
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Figure 8: Dierence between the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions (panel a) and the
Nash and the Egalitarian solutions (panel b) under CRRA specication over the range  2 [0;2].
On the rst panel, the dierence is maximized for  = 1:28.Working PaPer SerieS
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